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Abstract—Protecting intellectual property (IP) in electronic
circuits has become a serious challenge in recent years. Logic
locking/encryption and layout camouflaging are two prominent
techniques for IP protection. Most existing approaches, however,
particularly those focused on CMOS integration, incur excessive
design overheads resulting from their need for additional circuit
structures or device-level modifications. This work leverages the
innate polymorphism of an emerging spin-based device, called the
giant spin-Hall effect (GSHE) switch, to simultaneously enable
locking and camouflaging within a single instance. Using the
GSHE switch, we propose a powerful primitive that enables
cloaking all the 16 Boolean functions possible for two inputs.
We conduct a comprehensive study using state-of-the-art Boolean
satisfiability (SAT) attacks to demonstrate the superior resilience
of the proposed primitive in comparison to several others in
the literature. While we tailor the primitive for deterministic
computation, it can readily support stochastic computation;
we argue that stochastic behavior can break most, if not all,
existing SAT attacks. Finally, we discuss the resilience of the
primitive against various side-channel attacks as well as invasive
monitoring at runtime, which are arguably even more concerning
threats than SAT attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of globalization affecting the design and
manufacturing process of integrated circuits (ICs), hardware
security has emerged as a critical concern. The exposure
to various adversaries, which may reverse engineer (RE)
ICs, counterfeit them, steal their intellectual property (IP),
inject hardware Trojans, leak and/or extract sensitive data at
runtime has escalated [1]. Next, we briefly review IP protection
schemes and attacks in general.
IC camouflaging seeks to mitigate RE attacks, wherein
the layout-level appearance of the IC is altered such that it
becomes intractable to decipher its underlying functionality
and IP. For CMOS integration, various techniques have been
proposed, e.g., look-alike gates [2], threshold-dependent cam-
ouflaging [3], [4], and obfuscated interconnects [5].
Logic locking/encryption obfuscates the IP functionality
rather than the device-level layout [6], [7]. The so-called key
gates are carefully tailored into the IP/chip, where only the
correct key can “unlock” the original functionality.
Analytical attacks targeting camouflaged (or locked) ICs
were initially introduced in [8], [9]. These attacks are based
on Boolean satisfiability (SAT) and the fact that a small set
of discriminating input patterns (DIPs) may suffice to infer
the camouflaged functionality (or locking key). Several SAT-
attack resilient techniques were recently proposed [6], [7],
*S. Patnaik and N. Rangarajan contributed equally.
[10]; however, most of these techniques are still vulnerable
to advanced analytical attacks such as [11]–[13].
Physical attacks range from non-invasive (e.g., power
side-channel attacks) and semi-invasive (e.g., localized fault-
injection attacks) to invasive attacks (e.g., RE, microprobing
the frontside/backside) [14]. Such attacks are also promising
for extracting sensitive data at runtime, even from secured
chips, e.g., [15], [16].
Emerging devices including, e.g., nanowire transistors,
carbon-based or spin-based devices, may offer lower power
dissipation and higher integration density compared to their
CMOS counterparts [17]. Additionally, emerging devices can
augment the CMOS technology to improve hardware secu-
rity [18]–[20]. The most promising aspect of many emerging
devices is polymorphism: a polymorphic gate can readily
implement different Boolean functions at runtime, where the
functionality is determined by an internal/external control
mechanism [20]. It is important to note that polymorphic gates
can inherently support both camouflaging and locking due to
the following reasons. First, owing to their uniform device-
level layout, the actual function of a polymorphic gate is
hard to determine, particularly when optical-imaging-based RE
techniques are used. Second, the actual function is dependent
on the control input, which can act as a key input.
In this work, we use the giant spin-Hall effect (GSHE)
switch, first proposed in [21], to build polymorphic gates
for advanced protection. More specifically, we leverage the
GSHE switch recently designed and analyzed by Rangarajan
et al. [22] in the context of probabilistic computing. We
emphasize that the notions of locking and camouflaging are
interchangeable in this work due to the polymorphic nature of
the proposed primitive, unlike for CMOS-centric approaches.
The contributions of this work can be summarized as follows.
1) We leverage a polymorphic, GSHE-based device to pro-
pose a versatile security primitive. The primitive provides
strong camouflaging capabilities—given two inputs, all
16 possible Boolean functions can be cloaked within a
single instance. We elaborate on the device as well as
the proposed primitive in detail in Sec. III.
2) We analyze the protection provided by the primi-
tive against attacks such as imaging- and electron-
microscopy-based RE, side-channel attacks, and analyt-
ical SAT attacks (Sec. V). As for SAT attacks, a com-
prehensive study is conducted and benchmarked against
prior state-of-the-art techniques. Immunity to SAT attacks
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for probabilistic computing, directly supported by the
primitive, is also discussed.
3) We outline the prospects of hybrid CMOS-GSHE designs
for industrial benchmarks. We observe that delay-aware
protection can provide strong resilience (against SAT
attacks) with negligible layout overheads.
II. BACKGROUND: PRIOR ART AND LIMITATIONS
In [23], the authors implemented a low-power and versatile
gate using a GSHE-based magnetic tunnel junction (MTJ) as
the basic switching element. However, this device is not explic-
itly tailored for security; it is unable to support logic locking
by itself, as it is not truly polymorphic. More concerning is
the limitation to only four possible Boolean functions, which
renders this primitive weak against SAT attacks (Sec. V).
Alasad et al. [24] use all-spin logic (ASL) to design
three different security primitives, supporting three sets of
camouflaged functionalities: INV/BUF, XOR/XNOR, and
AND/NAND/OR/NOR. The layouts of the three primitives are
unique; they can be readily distinguished by imaging-based RE
tools, which also eases subsequent SAT attacks (Sec. V).
Winograd et al. [25] introduced a spin-transfer torque
(STT)-based reconfigurable lookup table (LUT), explicitly
addressing hardware security. However, their approach falls
short in terms of resilience against SAT attack. (Note that the
authors did not report on any SAT attack themselves.) We
protect the s38584 benchmark according to their technique and
observe that the protected layout can be decamouflaged in less
than 30 seconds on average (over 100 runs of camouflaging
and SAT attacks). This weak resilience stems from the limited
use of their STT-LUT primitive to curb power, performance,
and area (PPA) overheads.
As for CMOS-centric camouflaging, most schemes incur a
high layout cost. For example, the look-alike NAND-NOR-
XOR gate proposed by Rajendran et al. [2] induces 4× area,
5.5× power, and 1.6× delay (compared to a regular two-
input NAND gate) whereas the threshold-dependent full-chip
camouflaging as proposed in [4] still induces overheads of
14%, 82%, and 150% in PPA, respectively. As a result, most
schemes are limited to a cost-constrained and selective appli-
cation, which has severe implications for security (Sec. V).
III. DEVICE-LEVEL DESIGN OF SPIN-BASED PRIMITIVE
Protection schemes based on emerging devices can be
competitive, even when compared to regular CMOS. While
the GSHE switch leveraged in this work is still in the nascent
stage of fabrication [26], it is nevertheless promising because
of its small scale and low power (Section III-B). As for the
relatively large delay, the GSHE-based primitive is still appli-
cable without inducing significant delay overheads (Sec. V).
A. Structure and Operating Principle of the GSHE Switch
The GSHE switch, which is at the heart of the proposed
primitive, is shown in Fig. 1. Above the heavy metal spin-
Hall layer (purple, bottom) are the write (W; red, bottom) and
read (R; red, top) nanomagnets (NM). These nanomagnets (W-
NM and R-NM) exhibit a negative mutual dipolar coupling.
On top of the R-NM sit two fixed ferromagnetic layers (dark
green) with anti-parallel magnetization directions.
Fig. 1. Structure of the GSHE switch. The concept is derived from [22], but
here we adopt a stacked integration to maximize the dipolar coupling.
Fig. 2. The current-centric truth tables for NAND and NOR functionalities,
with inputs A and B (X is a control signal). As always the case for our
GSHE-based primitive, logic 1/0 is represented by an output current +I/-I.
Applying a charge current to the bottom layer (large golden
arrow in Fig. 1) results in spin accumulation of one polar-
ity (green spin-up spheres) in the transverse direction (pink
arrows) [22]. This spin-polarized current then imparts a spin-
transfer torque (STT) to the W-NM [27]. The STT switches
the W-NM from one stable state to the other which, in
turn, switches the R-NM in the opposite sense.1 Now, the
magnetization direction of the R-NM will be parallel to one
of the fixed ferromagnets on top and anti-parallel to the other.
The parallel path offers a lower resistance for a charge current
passing from/to the respective top contact to/from the output
terminal. This read-out phase commences once voltages are
applied to the top contacts (V + and V −). Depending on the
polarity of the voltage applied to the low-resistance path, the
output current either flows inward or outward—this represents
the binary result of the GSHE switch operation (see Fig. 2).
B. Characterization and Comparison of the GSHE Switch
The conceptual layout of the GSHE switch (Fig. 3) is drawn
based on the design rules for beyond-CMOS devices [17],
i.e., in units of maximum misalignment length λ. The area of
the GSHE switch is accordingly estimated to be 0.0016µm2.
The material parameters are given in Table I. Notably, a spin
current (IS) of at least 20µA is required in this work to
guarantee a deterministic switching behavior.
The performance of the switch is determined by the nano-
magnetic dynamics, which is simulated using the stochas-
tic Landau-Lifshitz-Gilbert-Slonczewski equation [29]. Three
simulated delay distributions are illustrated in Fig. 4. For the
propagation delay of the primitive, we subsequently assume a
mean delay of 1.55 ns obtained for IS = 20 µA.
The power dissipation for the read-out phase is derived
according to the equivalent circuit shown in Fig. 3 (inset).
Using the following equations and the parameters listed in
Table I, the power dissipation of the GSHE switch (including
leakage) is derived as 0.2125 µW.
P =
VOUT
2
r
+ (VSUP − VOUT )2GP + (VOUT + VSUP )2GAP
1That is because in the presence of negative magnetic dipolar coupling, the
minimum energy state is the one in which the W and R nanomagnets are
anti-parallel to each other [21].
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TABLE I
MATERIAL PARAMETERS OF THE GSHE SWITCH
Parameter Value
Volume of nanomagnets (NM) (28× 15× 2) nm3 [22]
Saturation magnetization Ms of NM
106 A/m (W-NM) [22]
5× 105 A/m (R-NM) [22]
Uniaxial energy density Ku of NM
2.5× 104 J/m3 (W-NM) [22]
5× 103 J/m3 (R-NM) [22]
Spin current IS , determ. switching 20 µA [22]
Resistance area product RAP 1 Ωµm2 [28]
Tunneling magnetoresistance TMR 170% [28]
Parallel conductance GP 420 µS
Anti-parallel conductance GAP 155.6 µS
Resistivity of heavy metal (HM) ρ 5.6× 10−7Ω–m
Spin-Hall angle θSH of HM 0.4
Thickness tHM of HM 1 nm
Internal gain β of HM 0.4× (15 nm/1 nm)
β = θSH × (wNM/tHM ) = 6
Resistance r of HM ≈ 1 kΩ
{
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Fig. 3. The conceptual layout of the GSHE switch (main part), and the
equivalent circuit (inset, derived from [21]). The power dissipation of the latter
is dictated by the resistance r of the heavy metal as well as the conductances of
the anti-parallel, high-resistance path (GAP ) and the parallel, low-resistance
path (GP ) build up by the fixed ferromagnets.
VSUP =
∣∣∣V +/−∣∣∣ = (IS
β
)(
1 + r(GP +GAP )
GP −GAP
)
; VOUT =
IS r
β
GP
GAP
= 1 + TMR; GP =
A(nanomagnets)
RAP
In Table II, we compare the metrics of the GSHE switch
against those of existing devices, including ones that are
not necessarily security-oriented. The switch is superior in
terms of energy/power but is limited in terms of delay. As
for security, the number of possible functions is the relevant
metric; here, the GSHE switch significantly outperforms prior
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Fig. 4. Delay distributions for the GSHE switch at various spin currents
(IS ). The distributions are obtained from 100,000 simulations. Although the
delays incurred in switching are stochastic, the switching process itself is still
deterministic. Note that the spread and mean delay diminish with increasing
IS , however, at the cost of higher power dissipation.
TABLE II
COMPARISON OF SELECTED EMERGING-DEVICE PRIMITIVES
Publication # Functions Energy Power Delay
[19] SiNW NAND/NOR 0.05–0.1 fJ 1.13–1.77 µW 42–56 ps
[24, a] ASL NAND/NOR/AND/OR 0.58 pJ 351.52 µW 1.65 ns
[24, b] ASL XOR/XNOR 1.16 pJ 351.52 µW 3.3 ns
[24, c] ASL INV/BUF 0.13 pJ 342.11 µW 0.38 ns
[30] DWM AND/OR 67.72 fJ 60.46 µW 1.12 ns
[20] DWM NAND/NOR/XOR/XNOR/ N/A N/A N/AAND/OR/INV
[23] GSHE AND/OR/NAND/NOR N/A N/A N/A
[25] STT NAND/NOR/XOR/ N/A N/A N/AXNOR/AND/OR
This work All 16 0.33 fJ 0.2125 µW 1.55 ns
art. Moreover, a delay-aware application can provide adequate
security without any significant overheads (Sec. V).
C. Security Primitive: Cloaking of all 16 Boolean Functions
All 16 possible Boolean functions implemented by the
proposed primitive are illustrated in Fig. 5. To realize
NAND/NOR, e.g., three charge currents are fed into the
bottom layer of the GSHE switch at once: two currents
represent the logic signals A and B, and the third current
(X) acts as the “tie-breaking” control input (recall Fig. 2).
For the XOR/XNOR functionalities, one signal is provided
as input current, whereas the other signal and its inverse are
provided as input voltages at the V + and V − terminals of the
fixed ferromagnets.2 Swapping the voltage polarities switches
between the complementary functions.
Note that three wires are used for the input terminal for
all 16 Boolean gates (recall Fig. 3); this renders the layout
of the primitive indistinguishable for optical-imaging-based
RE, irrespective of the actual functionality. As such, some
gates will require dummy wires. Depending on the threat
model and concept for chip-level implementation (Sec. IV),
one may implement these dummy wires using RE-resilient
interconnects in the BEOL [5], or with the help of additional
MUXes and key bits to seemingly switch between real/dummy
wires at the FEOL. Similar protection is required for the
assignment of the different input voltages and control signals.
Finally, in addition to the 16 functions illustrated in Fig. 5,
we can readily extend our primitive to cloak latches and flip-
flops, by applying the clock signal to the fixed ferromagnets’
terminals. Besides, the primitive can readily implement multi-
input gates (i.e., >2 signal inputs) as well.
IV. THREAT MODEL AND CONCEPT FOR SECURE
CHIP-LEVEL IMPLEMENTATION
We assume the fab and the end-user to be untrusted; the
ultimate goal for any adversary is to understand the true
functionality of a camouflaged/locked chip. Our threat model
represents a notable advancement over prior work related to
camouflaging, where the IP holder traditionally must trust the
fab because of the device/circuit-level protection mechanism.
2Toward this end, magneto-electric transducers [31] may be placed in the
interconnects. Such transducers can be tailored for uniform, indistinguishable
layouts, and can be used to convert (i) charge currents to their reverse (+I to
-I, or B to B’), (ii) voltages to charge currents (high/low voltage to +/-I), and
(iii) charge currents to voltages (+/-I to high/low voltages).
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Fig. 5. All 16 possible Boolean functionalities for two inputs, A and B, implemented using the proposed primitive. If required, X serves as control signal,
not as regular input. Note that BUF and INV capture two functionalities each.
To hinder fab-based adversaries, we outline two equally
promising options for secure implementation: either (a) lever-
age split manufacturing [32] or (b) provision for a tamper-
proof memory. For option (a), the wires for the control inputs
and the ferromagnet terminals shall remain protected from the
untrusted FEOL fab. Hence, these wires have to be routed at
least partially through the BEOL, which must be manufactured
by a separate, trusted fab. For option (b), the tamper-proof
memory holds a secret key that defines (using some additional
circuitry) the correct assignment of control inputs and voltages
for all devices. The key must be loaded (by the IP holder) into
the memory only after fabrication.
A malicious end-user can obtain the design specifics of the
chip through RE and side-channel attacks. She/he can also
use a working chip as an oracle for analytical attacks. In the
remainder of this paper, we focus on malicious end-user.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Study on Large-Scale IP Protection Against SAT Attacks
Setup: We model the proposed primitive and those of
selected prior art [2], [3], [19], [20], [23]–[25], [35] as
outlined in [9], [36]. Although the proposed primitive also
supports locking, here we contrast it only to camouflaging
primitives; logic locking and camouflaging are transformable
notions without loss of generality [36]. Note that we also
contrast to CMOS-centric techniques; this is meaningful as
any scheme hinges on the number and composition of their
cloaked functionalities [8], [9], not their implementation (i.e.,
at least for analytical attacks). For a fair evaluation, the same
set of gates are protected—gates are randomly selected once
for each benchmark, memorized, and then reapplied across all
techniques. We evaluate all techniques against powerful SAT
attacks [8], [12], [37], run on Intel Xeon server (2.3 GHz, 4
GB per task allowed). The time-out (“t-o”) is set to 48 hours.
Benchmarks: We conduct our experiments on traditional
benchmarks suites (ISCAS-85, MCNC, and ITC-99), on the
large-scale EPFL suite [33], and on the industrial IBM su-
perblue circuits [34] (Table III). For the IBM superblue cir-
cuits, we leverage [38] to synthesize and generate the layouts
TABLE III
CHARACTERISTICS OF SYNTHESIZED BENCHMARKS (ITALICS: EPFL
Suite [33]; BOLD: IBM Superblue Suite [34])
Benchmark Inputs Outputs Gates Benchmark Inputs Outputs Gates
aes core 789 668 39,014 log2 32 32 51,627
b14 277 299 11,028 sb1 8,320 13,025 856,403
b21 522 512 22,715 sb5 11,661 9,617 741,483
c7552 207 108 4,045 sb10 10,454 23,663 1,117,846
ex1010 10 10 5,066 sb12 1,936 4,629 1,523,108
pci bridge32 3,520 3,528 35,992 sb18 3,921 7,465 659,511
for further analysis. As for SAT attacks, we pre-process the
sequential circuits (IBM superblue) as follows: the inputs (and
outputs) of all flip-flops become primary outputs (and inputs);
thereafter, the flip-flops are removed. (Doing so is essential to
mimic access to scan chains for the SAT attacks [9].)
On provably secure versus large-scale schemes: Contrary
to provably secure schemes such as [6], [7], [10], one may find
it difficult to engage in “plain” but large-scale camouflaging.
The key reason for this concern is that the solution space
C—covering all possible functionalities of a camouflaged
design and thereby defining the computational efforts for
SAT attacks—is hard to quantify precisely [8]–[10]. More
specifically, C depends primarily on (i) the number and the
composition of functions cloaked by each primitive and (ii) the
number and selection of gates protected with a primitive.
Recall that prior art is limited in both (i) and (ii) by cost
considerations. In contrast, thanks to the innate polymorphism
of the proposed primitive, we are unbound toward large-
scale and even full-chip camouflaging. Moreover, the primitive
cloaks all 16 possible functionalities. Intuitively, our scheme
should thus impose maximal efforts for SAT attacks. We
believe that this renders our scheme competitive on par with
provably secure techniques, and we substantiate this statement
with a comprehensive study below.
Results: Table IV contrasts the resilience (against [8], [37])
of all considered schemes for large-scale application. For the
same number of gates protected, we observe that the more
functions a primitive can cloak, the more resilient it becomes
in practice. More importantly, the runtimes required for de-
camouflaging (if possible at all), tend to scale exponentially
with the percentage of gates being camouflaged.
Our primitive induces by far the highest efforts across all
benchmarks. Except for ex1010, none of the benchmarks could
be resolved within 48 hours once we protect 20% or more of
all gates. To confirm this superior resilience, we conducted
further attacks running for 240 hours for full-chip protection
using the proposed primitive—the designs could still not be
resolved. Moreover, we also observe some computational fail-
ures;3 this hints on another practical limitation w.r.t. scalability
for SAT attacks, as one can reasonably expect [9].
Besides the attacks of [8], [37], we also leverage Double
DIP [12]. The key advancement of this attack is that it rules
out at least two incorrect keys in each iteration. Conducting the
very same set of experiments as in Table IV, we observe that
the runtimes are on average higher across all benchmarks. For
example, decamouflaging aes core (for 10% protection using
our primitive) requires ≈7 hours using [8], but ≈15 hours us-
3E.g., “internal error in ’lglib.c’: more than 134,217,724 variables”.
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TABLE IV
RUNTIME FOR OUR SAT ATTACKS (USING [8], [37]), IN SECONDS (TIME-OUT T-O IS 172,800 SECONDS, I.E., 48 HOURS)
Benchmark
10% IP Protection 20% IP Protection
[2] [3], [25] [19] [24, c], [35] [23], [24, a] [20] Our [2] [3], [25] [19]† [24, c], [35] [23], [24, a] [20]‡ Our
(3)∗ (6)∗ (4)∗† (2)∗ (4)∗ (7+1)∗‡ (16)∗
aes core 610 4,710 890 132 536 6,229 25,890 4,319 41,844 11,306 407 9,432 t-o t-o
b14 2,078 20,603 11,465 6,884 17,634 27,438 60,306 56,155 t-o 64,145 8,426 t-o t-o t-o
b21 7,813 162,324 45,465 3,977 24,035 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o
c7552 37 210 74 12 66 371 2,289 169 14,575 1,153 110 1,327 172,548 t-o
ex1010 62 215 82 12 73 295 922 171 1,047 274 38 250 1,310 4,701
log2 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o
pci bridge32 1,119 t-o 9,011 1,325 2,690 t-o t-o 54,577 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o
30% IP Protection 40–100% IP Protection§
aes core 17,148 t-o 31,601 2,020 26,498 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o 8,206 t-o t-o t-o
b14 56,787 t-o t-o 38,495 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o
b21 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o
c7552 1,786 t-o t-o 766 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o 41,721 t-o t-o t-o
ex1010 448 4,357 938 87 719 11,736 24,727 1,703 t-o 129,290 169—7,073§ 1,950 t-o t-o
log2 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o
pci bridge32 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o
∗Number of cloaked functions; refer to Table II or the related publication for the actual sets of cloaked functions. Prior art covering the same set is grouped into one column.
†Here we refer to the camouflaging primitive, not the polymorphic gate reported on in Table II. ‡Here we also assume BUF to be available. §The benchmark ex1010 can be
resolved for 100% IP protection, when the primitives of [24, c], [35] are used. The related runtime range is for 40–100% protection; all other runtimes are for 40% protection.
ing [12].4 This finding suggests that large-scale camouflaging
can be indeed on par with provably secure schemes.
Independent of our study, note that some prior art (e.g., [25])
proposed cost-limited protection schemes. Here we have
demonstrated that an overly limited protection cannot with-
stand powerful SAT attacks (also recall Sec. II for [25]).
Next, we outline the prospects for camouflaging of industrial
circuits. Recall that the delay of the GSHE switch is consider-
ably higher when compared to CMOS (Sec. III). Interestingly,
large-scale circuits typically exhibit biased distributions of
delay paths, with most paths having short delays but few paths
having dominant, critical delays (Fig. 6). In an experimental
study on those IBM superblue circuits, we replace CMOS gates
in the non-critical paths with the GSHE-based primitive such
that no delay overheads can be expected.5 On an average, we
can camouflage 5–15% of all gates this way. Conducting SAT
attacks [8], [37] on those protected designs, we observe that
they cannot be resolved within 240 hours; in fact, most runs
incur similar failures as discussed above. This indicates that
the proposed primitive can help to strongly protect industrial
circuits without excessive layout (PPA) overheads.
B. On Stochastic Switching to Hinder SAT Attacks
So far we leveraged the primitive in the context of classical,
deterministic computation. Note, however, that the underlying
GSHE switch supports tunable probabilistic computation [22].
Interestingly, the implications of probabilistic computation on
hardware security are largely unexplored.
Recall the general principle of SAT attacks, i.e., to carefully
apply input patterns on a working chip and to observe the
output patterns, throughout multiple sampling iterations, until
the correct assignment for all key bits can be derived (by ruling
out incorrect keys via disagreement). Now consider a scenario
where the GSHE switch (or any probabilistic device, for that
4Due to lack of space, we refrain from providing all detailed results on [12].
5We anticipate such hybrid designs to be practical, given the CMOS-
compatible manufacturing of spin-based devices [39]. The main focus of
this work, however, is hardware security, not circuit design. Hence, to mimic
hybrid designs, we replace the delay numbers of selected CMOS gates in
non-critical timing paths with that of the GSHE switch, i.e., 1.55 ns.
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Fig. 6. Delay distributions of selected IBM superblue circuits. The paths with
the longest, critical delays are marked by crosses for clarity.
matter) is tuned for 95% accuracy. This implies that 5% of
the patterns observed by the SAT attack are incorrect.
We believe that most if not all proposed SAT attacks will fail
in such scenarios.6 That is because they have not been tailored
to account for incorrect output patterns. Even if they were,
distinguishing incorrect patterns from correct ones is difficult
when only given a “probabilistic black-box oracle.” Naturally,
one might want to leverage machine learning (ML) toward
this end. We argue, however, it remains to be seen whether
ML-based attacks will be sufficiently robust and capable. Here
we like to point out that (i) the GSHE switch experiences
thermally induced stochasticity [22], (ii) the error rate for any
switch can be tuned individually, and (iii) those individual
distributions superpose with each other while they propagate
throughout the entire design, resulting in stochastically corre-
lated behavior at the primary outputs.
C. Preventing Reverse Engineering and Side-Channel Attacks
Layout identification and read-out attacks: Recall that
the layout of the proposed primitive is uniform (Sec. III),
hence indistinguishable for optical-imaging-based RE. A more
sophisticated attacker might, however, leverage electron mi-
croscopy (EM) for identification and read-out attacks [16].
6The most promising contender here is arguably AppSAT [11], which is
based on the probably-approximately-correct (PAC) paradigm. The attack as
outlined in [11], however, requires a consistent solution space regarding the
input-output queries—probabilistic computation violates this assumption. The
attack was not available to us for an experimental study at this time.
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While such attacks are yet to be demonstrated on switching
devices at runtime, we believe that the proposed primitive can
prevent them. First, the dimensions of the GSHE switch are
significantly smaller than CMOS devices, which is a challenge
regarding the spatial resolution for EM-based analysis [16].
Second, the primitive is truly polymorphic, i.e., its function-
ality can be switched at runtime; see also next.
Polymorphism at the chip-level: Given truly polymorphic
gates and some circuitry to judiciously switch the function-
alities of gates, we can implement runtime polymorphism
at the chip-level. Then, internal functionalities are not static
(possibly even for static input patterns), whereupon an RE-
centric attacker is bound to misinterpret parts of the layout—
it is virtually impossible to resolve all dynamic features on
full-chip scale at once.7 Independent of RE threats, runtime
polymorphism at the chip-level can also enable dynamic
protection, e.g., as recently proposed by Koteshwara et al. [40].
Their idea is to alter the key dynamically, thereby rendering
runtime-intensive attacks incapable (SAT attacks in particular).
Photonic side-channel attacks: While CMOS devices emit
photons during operation, making them vulnerable to powerful
attacks such as [41], the GSHE switch itself does not emit
any photons. The fundamentally different switching principle
hence makes the proposed primitive inherently resilient to
read-out attacks based on photons. Still, we caution that an
assessment against such attacks shall be performed in future.
Magnetic and temperature attacks: Ghosh et al. [18]
outlined attacks on spintronic (memory) devices using mag-
netic fields and temperature curves. The design of the GSHE
switch shall ensure a robust coupling between the W and
R nanomagnets [22]. This would naturally be disturbed by
any external magnetic fields. Hence, an attacker leveraging a
magnetic probe may induce stuck-at-faults which are, however,
hardly controllable due to multiple factors (very small size of
switches, accordingly large magnetic fields required for the
probe, state of W and R magnetizations, the orientation of the
fixed magnets, voltage polarities on the fixed magnets). This
implies that sensitization attacks such as [2] will be difficult,
if practical at all. Regarding temperature-driven attacks, note
that the retention time of the switch will be impacted. The
resulting disturbances, however, are likely stochastic due to
the inherent thermal noise in the nanomagnets.
VI. CONCLUSION
We explore the security aspects of the GSHE switch: a
versatile spin-based polymorphic device which can support
both camouflaging and logic locking. Through a comprehen-
sive study using SAT attacks, we show the strong resilience
of our deterministic primitive as compared to prior art. We
further discuss the resilience of our primitive against various
classes of side-channel attacks. Finally, we lay the foundations
for promising security concepts: truly polymorphic behavior at
runtime, and stochastic behavior to thwart analytical attacks.
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